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v. Rowell" involves the same technicality and the judgment of conviction
was set aside. However, the judgment of reversal has been vacated and
the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for further
consideration in light of United States v. Buie, supra. On the other
hand, the majority seem to hold that the presentation of marijuana to
governmental authorities for inspection when it is being imported into
the United States does not violate one's privilege against self incrimination even without the required written order form and without payment of the transfer tax.
MABLE A. MINOR

The Affiliations Between Pennsylvania's Abortion Laws and
Dying Declarations
ATTEMPTING TO PROCURE AN ABORTION

Whoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman,
unlawfully administers to her any poison, drug or substance, or unlawfully uses any instrument, or other means, with the like intent, is
guilty of felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a
fine not exceeding three thousand dollars ($3,000), or undergo imprisonment by separate or solitary confinement at labor not exceeding
five (5) years, or both.'
Commonwealth v. Sierakowski and Commonwealth v. Williard2 particularly noted the aforementioned Pennsylvania statute's dissemination
of the acts which constitute an attempt to procure an abortion; a factual
stipulation contained within the language of this statute is that "the mere
attempt per se is the veritable crime-the actual abortion is not the crime."
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in deciding both of these cases, adjudicated it unnecessary that an actual abortion occur or that the woman
actually be pregnant. Simply stated, the area of the crime lies within the
attempt to procure an abortion.
"415 F.2d 300 (1969).
1 Penn.

Penal Code, P.L. 872, 18 P.S. § 4718 (June 1939).

See 39 Temp. L.Q.

33 (1965).

'Com. v. Sierakowski, 154 Pa. Super. 321, 35 A.2d 790 (1943); Com. v. Williard, 179 Pa. Super. 368, 116 A.2d 751 (1955). Com. v. Adams (Pa. 1961), 11
Bucks Co. L. Rep. 233 (1962).
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ABORTION LAWS AND DYING DECLARATIONS
Logically speaking, the crime of abortion is the wilful bringing
about of the miscarriage of a woman without justification or excuse.
Many of the modern statutes punish, as a substantive offense, an attempt
to cause such an unlawful miscarriage. This offense is sometimes called
very properly, an 'attempt to produce an abortion'; but in some statutes
3
this attempt itself is called 'abortion.'
CAUSING DEATH BY ABORTION

Section 719 of the Pennsylvania Penal Code of 1939, P.L. 872, provides:
Whoever unlawfully administers to any woman, pregnant or quick
with child, or supposed and believed to be pregnant or quick with
child, any drug, poison or other substance, or unlawfully uses any
instrument or other means, with the intent to procure the miscarriage
of such woman, resulting in the death of such woman, or any child
with which she may be quick, is guilty of felony, and upon conviction
thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding six thousand
dollars ($6,000), or undergo imprisonment -by separate or solitary
4
confinement at labor not exceeding ten (10) years, or both.
This section distinctly manifests that it is not a misdemeanor to cause
death by an abortion but rather it is a felony, whether or not the woman
upon whom the abortion was procured did or did not subsequently expire;
death is not an essential component of the crime, it is merely considered
for the purpose of determining the applicable sentence to be imposed.'
Although there appears to be no existing specific statute making the
crime of abortion a felony, the crime is hermetically compressed between
that of an attempt to procure an abortion," which is a felony, and that of
causing death in/by the performance of an abortion,7 which is also a
felony, and is, therefore, itself a felony.' In its decision in Commonwealth
v. Adams,' the Pennsylvania Court emphatically adjudicated that "It is
the attempt to produce an abortion which constitutes the crime and there
Criminal Law, p. 140 (2d ed. 1969).
'18 P.S. §4719.
'Com. v. Trombetta, 131 Pa. Super. 489, 200 A. 107 (1938) ; Coin. v. Sierakowsk:, supra. 18 P.S. §§ 4718, 4719.
'PERKINS,

'See note 4, supra.
7 18 P.S. § 4719.
8 Com. v. Cohen, 31 Pa. D. & C. 249 (1937), 21 Westmoreland L.J. 198 (19361938).
SCorn. v. Adams, supra.
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can be no attempt to commit a crime which is itself a mere attempt to do
an act or to accomplish a result."
DYING DECLARATIONS IN CASES OF ABORTION

With respect to "dying declarations" in abortion cases, section 1 of
the Pennsylvania Penal Code of June 26, 1895, P.L. 387, provides the

following:
The ante-mortem statements of any woman, who shall hereafter die
in consequence of any criminal acts producing or intended to produce
a miscarriage of such woman, as to the causes of her injuries shall be
competent evidence on the trial of any persons charged with the commission of such injuries, with like effect and under like limitations as
apply to dying declarations in prosecutions for felonious homicide:
Provided, however, that before such statement shall be submitted
to the jury as evidence the commonwealth shall, by competent and
satisfactory evidence, prove that such woman was of sound mind at
the time such ante-mortem statements were made: And provided further, That no conviction shall be had upon the uncorroborated declaration of such woman. 10
An abortion causing death was a homicide at common law. "It is now

a rule of almost universal application that dying declarations are admissible
only in cases of felonious homicide, where the death of the deceased is the
subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death are the subject
of the dying declarations."" In Commonwealth v. Bruce, 188412 evidence
of the dying declaration in extremis which was made by the deceased, whose
death ensued from an abortion, was admissible because the court held that
under the existing statute the death of the woman was an essential constituent of the crime itself. One year later, the court, overruling its
previous holdings and in deciding Railing v. Commonwealth,'" stated that

the dying declarations of the victim of an abortion were not admissible in
evidence even though the victim should subsequently die from such criminal operation; an addition to such a peculiar decision the court also
decided that the final result of the statutory offense of causing death by
abortion was not homicide. But on June 26, 1895, P.L. 387 was enacted,
19 P.S. § 583.
"49 A.L.R. 1284.
12 Com. v. Bruce, 16 Phila. 510 (Pa. 1884). See also 49 A.L.R. 1286.
Railing v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. 100, 1 A. 314, 6 Am. Crim. Rep. 7 (1885).
See also 49 A.L.R. 1286.
10
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ABORTION LAWS AND DYING DECLARATIONS
making "dying declarations competent evidence in prosecutions for criminal
abortions, when the subject shall die in consequence of such unlawful
acts."' 4 This statute was later enforced in Commonwealth v. Keene 5 and
the constitutionality of the statute was later upheld by the decision reached
in Commonwealth v. Winkelman 6 in which the court said:
Dying declarations are only admissible when made by a person who
is under the influence of an impression that her dissolution is impending. This is a preliminary fact to be proved by the party offering
them in evidence, and the proof offered for this preliminary purpose
is addressed in the first instance to the conscience of the court. It need
not be proved that the declarant stated in so many words that her
statement was made under a sense of impending death. It is enough
if it appears satisfactorily in any legitimate mode that it was made
under that sanction. The -belief of a sudden dissolution is the test
by which the competency of dying declarations is to be measured.
In Commonwealth v. Heffelfinger, 1923, and Commonwealth v. Shearer, 1923, the court 17 decidedly affirmed the validity and constitutionality
of the 1895 statute by indicatively stating that the statute further provided
that there could be no conviction unless the dying declaration was
corroborated. In Commonwealth v. Antonini, 1949,18 the court declared
that dying declarations were only admissible when they were made by the
victim of a homicide for which the defendant was on trial. In Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 1969," 9 it was held that a person's guilt of performing an illegal abortion could not be established by evincing circumstantial evidence.
As attested to by Pennsylvania statutes,2" abortion per se is not
readily perceived as a criminal offense. The aggregate breach of law is
(1) attempting to procure an abortion and (2) causing death by abortion;
evidence of a mere "attempt" suffices the former requisite, yet "death"
does not represent an essential constituent of the latter element. The crime
"See note 10, supra.
15 Com. v. Keene, 7 Pa. Super. 293 (1898).
10 Corn. v. Winkelman, 12 Pa. Super. 497 (1900); Corn. v. Kline, 66 Pa. Super.
285. See generally 33 Lanc. L. Rev. 299 (Pa. 1917).
"' Corn. v. Heffelfinger, 82 Pa. Super. 351 (1923); Corn. v. Shearer, 82 Pa.
Super. 355 (1923). See 69 Pa. D. & C. 531; 49 A.L.R. 1286; 167 A.L.R. 171; Corn.
v. Thomas, 94 Pa. Super. 353 (1928) (concurring opinion); 91 A.L.R. 561.
".Corn. v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69 A.2d 436 (1949). See 4 A.L.R.3d
683.
" Corn. v. Zimmerman, 214 Pa. Super. 61, 251 A.2d 819 (1969).
20

18 P.S. §§ 4718, 4719.
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of abortion, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, is constricted within
the hermetic fusion of these two components.
In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as an exception to the hearsay
rule, dying declarations, made by the homicide victim of a criminal
abortion for which the defending party is on trial, are admissible evidence.
However, under a statutory mandate, 21 the courts are specifically directed not to otherwise grant a conviction if such dying declarations are
uncorroborated. The test availed in determining the competency of dying
declarations, provable by any legitimate mode-such as the declarant's
lack of mental incompetency, is the declarant's "belief" of an impending
dissolution.
JOSEPH M. IACOVITTI
2 19 P.S. § 583.
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